Roger Williams University Law Review
Volume 13
Issue 2 Symposium: Law and Terrorism
Spring 2008

The Corruption of Civilizations
Timothy K. Kuhner
Roger Williams University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR
Recommended Citation
Kuhner, Timothy K. (2008) "The Corruption of Civilizations ," Roger Williams University Law Review: Vol. 13: Iss. 2, Article 2.
Available at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR/vol13/iss2/2

This Symposia is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at DOCS@RWU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Roger Williams
University Law Review by an authorized administrator of DOCS@RWU. For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.

Article 2

The Corruption of Civilizations
Timothy K. Kuhner*

Remarks by other panelists at today's conference' have
clarified and problematized increases in executive power,
detriments to human rights, and the emergence of an ever-more
adversarial and evasive political environment that removes
transparency, accountability, rationality, and even principle from
legal discourse. These remarks eulogize the war on terrorism's
non-human casualties. I wish to point out with acute remorse
that these casualties all belonged to a single family and that this
family constituted our tradition. This was a tradition of liberal
democracy, where torture was off the table and procedural
Aggressive warfare signaled
protections were a centerpiece.
criminality, not patriotism. Human dignity, the rule of law, and
the intelligent pursuit of peace, prosperity, and stability
This
emblazoned the halls of this place where we resided.
tradition was hard-won; its emergence costly and far-sighted, a
precious gift of heritage that we were tasked with maintaining, or
even improving.
I also wish to say that although the rhetoric of our tradition's
demise is appealing for its dramatic excess, it is too conceited for
me to maintain to the end, for it is not the demise of our tradition
that we are witnessing but our abandonment of the same. The
tradition will endure, at least in a cryogenically frozen state, until
new adherents seek it out. My position, however, is that we
should re-adhere to it now and save future generations the
Here, focusing on our treatment of detainees and
trouble.
* Associate Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law; J.D.
and LL.M., magna cum laude, Duke University School of Law. I thank Peter
Margulies and Jason Morgan-Foster for their comments.
1. Roger Williams University School of Law, Legal Dilemmas in a
Dangerous World: Law, Terrorism, and National Security, (Nov. 9, 2007).
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aggressive warfare-just two of the ways we have abandoned our
tradition-I will lay out a brief civilizational requiem. This
redescribes the war on terrorism in a way that makes its excesses
all the less appealing and its broader consequences all the more
clear.
I. A DIALECTIC OF EXTREMISM

I submit that the supposed conflict between terrorists and the
architects of our war on terrorism is in reality a collaborative
relationship between two groups of extremists whose modes of
action undermine civilizational commitments.
The "clash of
civilizations" predicted by Samuel Huntington and endorsed by
Osama Bin Laden 2 and George Bush 3 alike ought to be described
2. Referring to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan post 9/11, Bin Laden
sees a united front in the West: "[t]he entire West, with the exception of a few
countries, supports this unfair, barbaric campaign, although there is no
evidence of the involvement of the people of Afghanistan in what happened in
America." He then goes on to describe creed as the basis that divides the
East from the West:
"This war is fundamentally religious. The people of the East are
Muslims. They sympathized with Muslims against the people of the
West, who are the crusaders. Those who try to cover this crystal
clear fact, which the entire world has admitted, are deceiving the
Islamic nation . . . Under no circumstances should we forget this
enmity between us and the infidels. For, the enmity is based on
creed . . . We should also renounce the atheists and infidels. It

suffices me to seek God's help against them. God says: 'Never will
the Jews or the Christians be satisfied with thee unless thou follow
their form of religion."'
Also notable in this same speech is Bin Laden's characterization of the
conflict itself, which he defines as religious and having nothing to do with
terrorism, except the terrorism that he believes the West has consistently
committed against Muslims. Bin Laden Rails Against Crusaders and UN,
B.B.C. NEWS, Nov. 3, 2001, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/
monitoring/media-reports/1636782.stm.
Phrases such as "the crusaderZionist alliance" also deserve mention. Statement of the World Islamic Front,
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/paral
docs/980223-fatwa.htm.
3. On the night September 11, 2001, the President addressed the
nation: "Today . . . our way of life, our very freedom came under attack."
George W. Bush, President, United States, Address to the Nation (Sept. 11,
2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/
20010911-16.html Here, I wish to be cautious, because it is the case that
Bush has been careful in his comments about Muslims generally and making
a distinction between terrorists ideology and Islam. But little can be said to
commend his description of terrorists' motives: he wants the American public
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as the corruption of civilizations. 4 Huntington famously predicted
in 1993 that the primary source of conflict in the world we now
inhabit would be cultural differences: "The fault lines between
civilizations will be the battle lines of the future," he warned;
"[t]he great divisions among humankind and the dominating
source of conflict will be cultural. 5 It quickly became fashionable
to believe that we would inevitably generate conflict just by being
ourselves and staying true to our own values. In reality, however,
the diverse set of conflicts relating to terrorism world-wide have
been spurred by actors who dishonor their own civilizational
commitments. Leaders on both sides distinguish themselves not
by being true to their civilizations, but by attempting to corrupt
their civilizations.
The underlying values and tactics among both camps are
fundamentally similar in their violation of foundational social
6
mores and legal norms. The Bush administration and Al Qaeda
employ unlawful modes of warfare-preemptive warfare and
terrorism are violations of fundamental customary and treaty
prohibitions in international law. Each denies civilized treatment
to its captives-indefinite detention without charges, torture, and
beheadings all contravene sacred norms of due process and
civilized treatment.7 And yet, each camp proclaims itself the
to believe that we are being attacked because we are free, because of who we
are, and what we represent, when in fact transnational Jihadis have always
had a practical set of goals relating to concrete foreign policies relating to the
Palestinian people, the U.S. military presence in Muslim lands, and so on.
4. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, FOREIGN AFF.,
Summer 1993, at 22. See also SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF
CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1998).
5. The Clash of Civilizations,supra note 4, at 454.
6. By referring to Al Qaeda by name, I do not mean to exclude other
transnational jihadis. There are of course multiple groups of doctrinaire

jihadis, such as the Islamic Group, Islamic Jihad, and al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad.
FAwAz A. GERGES, THE FAR ENEMY: WHY JIHAD WENT GLOBAL 1 (2005).
7. It is in fact remarkable that the United States continues, post
invasion of Afghanistan, to apply a war paradigm in the first place. At the
time of the World Trade Center bombings, there was a legal presumption

that terrorism was not an act of war. See Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 505 F.2d 989, 1012 (2d Cir. 1974) ("The cases
establish that war is a course of hostility engaged in by entities that have at
least significant attributes of sovereignty. Under international law war is
waged by states or state-like entities."). In a trial that ensued after 1993, a
federal court of appeals upheld the conviction of a terrorist acting on U.S. soil
for conspiracy to levy war against the United States. United States v.
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guardian of sacred values-those of Western freedom on the one
hand and Islamic faith on the other-while simultaneously
employing tactics that can only be described as the antithesis of
those same values. Just as the great majority of Muslims decry Al

Qaeda8 (never mind suicide bombing and the beheading of
hostages), the majority of Americans disapprove of the Bush
Administration 9 (never mind the use of torture and preemptive

warfare).
The underlying similarity between both sides' derogations
reveals another crucial clarification: the only clash to be seen is
one between extremists on both sides, our extremists and their
extremists. And upon closer examination, it may not be so much
of a clash as a symbiosis. Each side proclaims to its respective
constituencies that its actions undermine the enemy, while in
reality each camp enthrones the other. The attacks of September
Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 123 (2d Cir. 1999) ("To support a conviction for
seditious conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 2384, the Government must
demonstrate that: (1) in a State, or Territory, or place subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, (2) two or more persons conspired to 'levy
war against' or 'oppose by force the authority of the United States
government, and (3) that the defendant was a member of the conspiracy.").
Despite using the word "war," this is a criminal charge. The Government
pressed criminal charges against those responsible, fighting terrorists in the
United States in the Article III courts, not by employing the laws of war on
its own territory. See Stacie D. Gorman, In the Wake of Tragedy: The Citizens
Cry Out for War, but Can the United States Legally Declare War on
Terrorism?, 21 PENN ST. INT'L. L. REV. 669, 676 (2003) ("the fact that the
terrorists were tried in the court system--not fought on the battlefield-indicates that terrorists are criminals, and not soldiers of war. Although the
charge against them was conspiracy to levy war against the United States,
this was a criminal charge, punishable with jail time, not an act of warfare to
be retaliated against with missiles."). One might compare our shift in policy
with Spain's staying the course, prosecuting in civilian courts those
responsible for Al Qaeda's bombing of a Madrid train station. Some people
were actually acquitted, but many were sentenced to long prison terms. But
they held these trials under conditions of the rule of law.
8. GERGES, supra note 6, at 270 ("[T]he dominant response to Al Qaeda
in the Muslim world was very hostile, and few activists, let alone ordinary
Muslims, embraced its global jihad . . . [Moreover,] a broad representative
spectrum of Arab and Muslim opinion makers and Islamists utterly rejected
bin Laden and Zawahiri's justification for their attacks on America and
debunked their religious and ideological rationale.").
9. In the most recent New York Times/CBS News poll, for example, only
28% of Americans approved of the job that President Bush is doing. David
Leonhardt & Marjorie Connelly, 81% in Poll Say Nation is Headed on Wrong
Track, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2008, at Al.
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11th have triggered a new era of fear and executive power, giving
President Bush and his neoconservative handlers the opportunity
they needed to invade Iraq and weaken the American commitment
to rights. The invasion of Iraq has succeeded in creating a strong
terrorist base where before there was none and elevated
Meanwhile, the American
recruitment levels world-wide. 10
weakened core alliances
has
rights
human
violation of civil and
11
and sympathies, playing directly into the hands of the terrorists.
Al Qaeda and the Bush administration have established a sort of
dialectic, a dialectic of extremism, in which each camp legitimates
and strengthens the other. And this is to say nothing of the
operational and financial linkages between jihadis and Americans
in Afghanistan during the 1980s, a theater of war where jihadis
politics, and
in combat,
acquired "practical experience
' 12
organizational matters."

II. OUR TRADITION
As this conflict escalates-the more we torture detainees and
drop bombs that kill civilians, the more they send their operatives
to our shores-hatred and fear will increasingly well up in our
guts, and we, the collective human "we," will come to forget who
we are and what we stand for. 13 It is imperative to remember and
to repeat the observation that most fairly characterizes this new
era: our extremists and their extremists undermine the core

See GERGES, supranote 6 and accompanying text.
11. See JOSEPH NYE, SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD
POLITICS, x (2004).
12. See GERGES, supra note 6, at 12, 14 ("Despite subsequent denials by
10.

both jihadis and American officials, the two camps were in a marriage of
Symbiosis
convenience, united in opposition to godless Communism.").
indeed. Jihadis and American hawks exhibit a classic case: "a relationship
between two people in which each person is dependent upon and receives

reinforcement, whether beneficial or detrimental, from the other." RANDOM
HOUSE COMPACT UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1926 (Special 2d ed. 1996).
13. I do not believe it is coincidental, for example, that citizens of

countries facing frequent terrorist attacks are far more tolerant of torture
than citizens of countries that rarely face terrorist attacks.

In a recent

survey, Israelis and Iraqis were far more tolerant of torture as official policy
(42-43% approving) than were citizens of the other twenty-three other

countries polled (29% on average supporting some torture). See One-Third
Support 'Some Torture,' B.B.C. NEWS, Oct. 19, 2006, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in-depth/6063386.stm#table.
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values that define Western and Islamic civilizations. Here, I
mean only to comment on our fidelity to our own mores, not their
fidelity to their own.
The treatment of prisoners makes inroads to certain mores.
We might bristle at our mind-boggling rate of incarceration. We
are home to only 5% of the global population, but almost a quarter
of the global prison population. 4 But America never promised not
to lock a lot of people up. This after all can partly be attributed to
a democratic tradition of electing judges and prosecutors at the
state level. "Law and order" remains a strong cultural value
here. 15
But our law and order culture is tempered by a
commitment to rights that spans domestic and international law:
due process, the prohibition on unlawful searches and seizures,
equal protection, the prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment, adherence to the Geneva Conventions, the Torture
Convention, the Civil and Political Rights convention, and so on.
Although it is true that we did not promise not to lock them up, we
have promised due process and civilized treatment.
Bring any great voice of our tradition to Abu Graib and
Guantanamo Bay and each of us would hear expressed the
civilizational agony we feel in our guts. Although on foreign
ground, these are our prisons and Dostoyevsky said that it was
' 16
here that "the degree of civilization in a society is revealed."
Even complex figures faced with the responsibilities of power beg
us to consider the linkage between civil liberties and civil society,
civilized treatment and civilization. As Chief Justice Burger put
it, "the way a society treats those who have transgressed against
17
it is evidence of the essential character of that society."'
14. Adam Liptak, Inmate Count in U.S. Dwarfs Other Nations, N.Y.
Apr. 23, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com2008/04/
23/us123prison.html?_r=l&oref=slogin.
TIMES,
15.

See, e.g., MARSHALL SHAPO, TORT LAW AND CULTURE 278-79 (2003)

(discussing the tensions between law and order culture and the notion,
expressed in police misconduct actions, that nobody is above the law).
16.

FYODOR DOSTOYEVSKY, THE HOUSE OF THE DEAD

76 (Constance

Garnett trans., 1923). Winston S. Churchill said precisely the same thing:
"[Tihe mood and temper of the public in regard to the treatment of crime and
criminals is one of the most unfailing tests of the civilization of any country."
See DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL
THEORY 215 n.4 (1990).

17. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523-24 (1984) ("The continuing
guarantee of these substantial rights to prison inmates is testimony to a
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Churchill gives the point more of what is due to it:
A calm and dispassionate recognition of the rights of the
accused against the state, and even of convicted criminals
against the state, a constant heart-searching by all
charged with the duty of punishment, a desire and
eagerness to rehabilitate . .., and an unfaltering faith
that there is a treasure, if you can only find it, in the
heart of every man, these are the symbols which in the
treatment of crime and criminals mark and measure the
stored-up strength of a nation, and are the sign and proof
of the living virtue in it. 18
We should hope that our unconscionable treatment of
prisoners abroad indicates the sort of decline in strength and
virtue that Churchill warned of, and not an abandonment of
strength and virtue altogether.
Yet, the Administration's efforts to legitimate indefinite
detention, change the definition of torture, and manufacture a
doctrine embracing illegal warfare suggest the worst of these two
scenarios. This would seem an effort to redefine strengthstrength in power, strength in brutality, strength in shock and
awe-and an effort to reshape virtue, now the vehemence of one's
self protection and the zealousness of one's pursuit of national
interest. And so aggression becomes strength, and single-minded
pursuit of security and particular advantages reshapes the
contours of virtue.
At one point, there was strength in reasoned restraint and
virtue in the rare form of compassion one might feel for an enemy.
Like many hard-won traditions of conscience, these meanings and
the courage to pursue them are located not solely within one
nation, but rather within a community of nations that has derived
shared lessons from history. These lessons, too civilizational in
scope to be proprietary, are forward looking. Their application is
surely the great labor of civilizational belonging, surely a great
benefit of civilizational belonging as well, for it is in living up to
belief that the way a society treats those who have transgressed against it is
evidence of the essential character of that society.")
18.

Winston S. Churchill, Address to the House of Commons (July 20,

1910), in 2 WINSTON S. CHURCHILL: His COMPLETE SPEECHES, 1897-1963, at

1589, 1598 (Robert Rhodes James ed. 1974).
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these lessons that we do what we know to be right and avoid the
entanglements that flow, inevitably, from misdeed.
The basic ethics of the long-standing, but threatened,
civilizational project in which Americans claim membership are
special in substance, not function.
Functionally, one is
deontological and the other is consequentialist. The first tells us
that the means matter; the second tells us that the ends do too.
But the moral value, the substance, at the heart of our
deontological ethic is nothing less than human dignity, and the
goods that our consequentialism seeks to maximize are nothing
less than peace, stability, and prosperity. Perhaps all traditions
are the same when viewed at this high level of abstraction,
varying only in how dignity and stability are defined, so let me be
more specific: indefinite detention without charges, torture, and
aggressive warfare violate both of our civilizational ethics. This
becomes a gentle reminder that we consider such means wrong
per se and that we already know that the ends professed for such
means will remain elusive. This much our tradition has learned
already at tremendous costs; this much we ignore only at the sake
of losing ourselves and having to begin anew in a state of
savagery.
Our deontological project of rights against the government is
indeed civilizational in scope and importance. In our tradition,
the protection of human dignity has undergone two separate
revolutions--one American (1776), the other international
(1945)-but its evolution began before either and has continued
19
after both. The Supreme Court has said so quite clearly:
"[O]wing to the progressive development of legal ideas and
institutions in England, the words of Magna Charta stood for very
different things at the time of the separation of the American
colonies from what they represented originally." 20 And since the
conclusion of the American Revolution, we have been improving
upon our "ancient liberties," for these have been rooted in the
"forms and processes found fit to give, from time to time, new
expression and greater effect to modern ideas of self19. The foregoing quotations and legal standards have evolved through
the Court's cruel and unusual punishment and due process jurisprudenceconstitutional protections transplanted from the English Declaration of
Rights of 1688 and the Magna Carta.
20. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 529 (1884).
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government. 2 1
Our project of self-government of course began with the
declaration of seemingly insincere ideas. How could we profess
"unalienable" rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness
How could we declare consent of the
while holding slaves?
governed the legitimizing feature of any government while
considering a large portion of the population to be mere property,
by nature ineligible for rights and self-authorship? 22 Where were
the political equality and popular sovereignty we professed?
Because the Declaration of Independence was believed by the
colonists to be compatible with slavery, we must recall its words at
present. The improvement in our ancient liberties, this process
that has given new expression and greater effect to our ideals,
defines our civilizational commitment to rights as hard-won, as a
series of lessons learned. We considered inhuman and unworthy
of rights an entire class of human beings while simultaneously
holding up human freedom as our master value, our claim to
legitimacy and respect. It was not until the slaves were free that
America could even begin to live up to her principles. This
evolution of rights reunited us with our conscience and our
tradition. Indeed, the tradition of rights in this country has all
the makings of an identity, a politically and philosophically
genealogical feature that connects America with a tradition that is
at once of her and beyond her.
The Supreme Court has proven itself an astute genealogist in
these regards. It has described those due process rights valid
against the states as "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"
23
and part of the "very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty."
Due process rights are those that stand between a human being

21. Id. at 530 ("[It is better not to go too far back into antiquity for the
best securities for our 'ancient liberties.' It is more consonant to the true
philosophy of our historical legal institutions to say that the spirit of personal
liberty and individual right, which they embodied, was preserved and
developed by a progressive growth and wise adaptation to new circumstances
and situations of the forms and processes found fit to give, from time to time,
new expression and greater effect to modern ideas of self-government.").
22. And for many years after the Declaration of Independence, we might
note that its principles posed no obstacle to treating Native Americans as a
savage feature of the land that we were free to eradicate, another category of
non-persons in which rights could not fully vest.
23. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
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and indefinite detention without charges or trials without
procedural guarantees. To abolish such rights, the Court has said
is to "violate a principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.""
Justice Cardozo famously noted that a "fair and enlightened
25
system of justice would be impossible without [such rights]."
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence reflects a similar
preoccupation with the civilizational pedigree, indeed identityconstituting importance, of fundamental rights. In explaining
why expatriation is cruel and unusual, a plurality of the Court
observed that "[t]he civilized nations of the world are in virtual

unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment
for crime." 26 A majority of the Court affirmed this comparative
law method of analysis in 2005,27 as well as the following
progression of meanings. Underlying and flowing through the
Eighth Amendment, the Court has found "the principle of civilized
treatment"28 and a process of "evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society." 2 9 Hearing these
phrases alerts us that it is this clause in our Bill of Rights that

prohibits torture and connects us with a notable trajectory from
savagery to civilization. The Court contextualizes our tradition of
Eighth Amendment protection within the "affirmation of certain
fundamental rights by other nations and peoples;" 30 this, the
Court believes, "simply underscores the centrality of those same
rights within our own heritage of freedom." 3 1 These words ring of
24. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
25. Id. Justice Cardozo died the next year. Palko is one testament to his
judicial philosophy, one relevant aspect of which he gave to us in these words:
"The great generalities of the Constitution have a content and a significance
that vary from age to age. The method of free decision sees through the
transitory particulars and reaches what is permanent behind them."
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 17 (Yale U.

Press 1921).
26. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958) (emphasis added).
27. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) ("The opinion of the
world community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected
and significant confirmation for our own conclusions.").
28. Trop, 356 U.S. at 99 (italics added).
29. Id. at 100; accord Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002).
Also of note are references to "our Anglo-American heritage." See, e.g.,
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-32 (1988).
30. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
31. Id.
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deep cultural and civilizational significance. All of this, in turn,
can be grounded upon a transcendental source that would seem to
explain cross-border similarities and complicate derogation: "The
basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less
32
than the dignity of man."
The dignity of man perhaps never received such a blow as
during World War II. Retooled as human dignity, this basic
concept came to underlie the United Nations Charter and the
international revolution it codified. 3 3 The dropping of two atomic
bombs within a month and a half after the signing of the Charter
renders facile any descriptive claim of human dignity's triumph,3 4
but its assent is, at least, normatively clear. "We the Peoples of
the United Nations [are] Determined . . . to reaffirm faith in

fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human
person," the preamble explains. 35 Responding to the ways in
which human dignity and peace were compromised, the Charter
prohibits aggressive force (i.e., preemptive war). Another body of
law-including the Geneva Conventions and their protocols, the
Hague Conventions, and customary law-regulates the conduct of
warfare, requiring, inter alia, civilized treatment of detainees and
minimization of civilian casualties. 36 Also responding to the
32.

Trop, 356 U.S. at 100; accord Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-12.

I

understand perfectly well, and doubt very much that this will be lost on
readers, that as a formalistic matter the extraterritorial application of the
Bill of Rights is generally dubious. I feel, however, that as a civilizational
matter, and as a self-definitional matter, that the seriousness of the values
and the depth of the tradition cannot be so easily waived by a technicality
which, importantly, is mostly rectified by our membership in human rights
treaties and the Geneva Conventions.
33. It would also be fair to say that human dignity, together with
pragmatic concern over Hitler's expansion, motivated U.S. involvement in
World War II.
34. The Charter was signed on June 26, 1945, and ratified on October 24.
August 6 and 9 of the same year stand as that moment in history when
Hiroshima and Nagasaki were sacrificed to cause Japan's surrender. For
commentary on these events, see Barton J. Bernstein, Introducing the
Interpretive Problems of Japan's 1945 Surrender:A HistoriographicalEssay
on Recent Literature in the West, in THE END OF THE PACIFIC WAR:
REAPPRAISALS 36-37 (Tsuyoshi Hasegawa ed., 2007).
35. U.N. Charter, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1153,
entered into force Oct. 24, 1945.
36. Regarding the jus ad bellum, see U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4, art. 51;
regarding the jus in bello, see, for example, Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for signature Aug.
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international
causes of World War II, the Charter establishes
37
collaboration in promoting human rights.
And then, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
which itself was labeled "the common standard of achievement for
all peoples and all nations," there came a further solemn
proclamation: "recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world. 3 8 The
Declaration admonishes governments that human rights are the
entitlement of "[e]veryone . . . without distinction of any kind,
such as race . . .religion, political or other opinion, national or

social origin, property, birth or other status," and that "no
distinction shall be made on the basis of the political,
jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to
which a person belongs . . . or under any other limitation of

The International Convention on Civil and
sovereignty." 3 9
Political Rights (ICCPR), one of the foundational human rights
treaties, reasserts the basic deontological thrust of human rights
and connects up with the Eighth Amendment: "these rights derive
40
from the inherent dignity of the human person."
Through entangled treaty law and customary law that makes
good on these precepts, the international revolution has
established that governments are not free to treat people in their
control however they please. This is the crucial limitation on
sovereignty established in law by the human rights movement.
The prohibition on torture, in fact, has been elevated to the status
of a jus cogens norm, a rare international law designation holding
derogation to be impermissible under any circumstance, including

12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, and Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
37. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 1 ("The Purposes of the United Nations
are: . ..To achieve international co-operation.., promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.").
38. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, pmbl., G.A. Res. 217A, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st Plen. Mtg., U.S. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
39. Id. at Art. 2.

40. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec.
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, available at http://heiwww.unige.chlhumanrts/
instreefb3ccpr.htm.
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war.4 1 Indeed, if human dignity is inherent, then certain rights
are inalienable, and accordingly some things simply cannot be
done. Sole, despotic dominion of territory and persons thereon is
thus rescinded from states. The international revolution is an
evolutionary leap in the "standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society."4 2 How could our prerogatives to
protect the dignity of man and make good on our own heritage of
freedom be taken seriously if states were free to pursue genocidal
policies or conquer each other at will? It follows in an essentially
evolutionary way that new rules and structures had to be
established to protect human dignity in an interdependent
community of states.
And so respect for fundamental rights is part of the
longstanding civilizational project in which we claim membership.
From the Magna Carta to the United Nations Charter, the
protection of human dignity through fundamental rights has
figured in our heritage and best efforts at producing a just society.
The rescinding of civil liberties at home, indefinite detention
without trial and torture abroad-from waterboarding to
extraordinary rendition-and the waging of preemptive warfare in
Iraq all speak to an abandonment of our own heritage of freedom;
the principle of civilized treatment forgotten, the principles of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people now
uprooted, plucked. Civilization forsaken. Our authority, freed
from civilizational constraints, knows no bounds-we are not
constrained by human dignity any longer, not limited by
constitutional law, perhaps not even aware of international law.
What hubris! Our extremists have reclaimed the right of conquest
41. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 53, U.N.
Doc.AIConf.39/27. 1155 U.N.T.S. 171, available at http://wwwl.umn.edu.edu/
humanrt/instree/b3ccpr.htm ("a peremptory norm of general international
law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of
States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which
can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law
having the same character."). On the jus cogens status of the prohibition on
torture, see, for example, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 cmt. n; Siderman de Blake v. Republic of
Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 717 (9th Cir. 1992) ("while not all customary
international law carries with it the force of a jus cogens norm, the
prohibition against official torture has attained that status.")
42. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958); Atkins v. Virginia, 536

U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002).
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over foreign lands and the ability to revoke the personhood of
those who threaten us. They have returned to savagery and the
country cannot long remain autonomous from the flavor of its
official acts. The rights of adverse possession will soon flow to
those who just recently began as unlawful occupiers of the
American tradition. Granted, these disseisors' occupation of our
tradition has not always been obvious; indeed, secrecy has
Nevertheless, the occupation has been notorious,
abounded.
hostile and brazen; our land has been altered. We must claim
trespass, less we acquiesce and cede title.
But perhaps the neoconservatives are right: in an era of
terrorism, we cannot afford to maintain naive principles, these
inconvenient traditions, this outmoded quality of conscience, for it
is the first duty of government-they remind us-to protect the
homeland. Once all terrorist groups of global reach are defeated,
then we can return to Eden. Here we come to the consequentialist
ethic at the heart of our civilizational project: the search for the
good ends of stability and peace. I suspect most of us might come
around to this ethic eventually if it were not so empirically
unsound when applied to torture and wars of aggression. General
David Petraeus, Commanding General of Iraq, has refuted the
argument made by our extremists:
"Some may argue that we would be more effective if we
sanctioned torture or other expedient methods to obtain
information from the enemy. That would be wrong.
Beyond the basic fact that such actions are illegal, history
shows that they also are frequently neither useful nor
necessary. Certainly, extreme physical action can make
what the individual says may be
someone 'talk;' however,
43
of questionable value."
Indeed, the U.S. Army's own4 4 field manual contains a longstanding prohibition on torture.
43. Letter

from

General

David

A.

Petraeus,

(May

10,

2007)

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/nation/documents/petraeus-values_05

1007.pdf.
44. See FM 34-52, Ch. 1, Department of the U.S. Army, Washington, DC,
May 8, 1987, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/policy/
("PROHIBITION AGAINST USE OF
armylfmlfm34-52/chapterl.htm
FORCE[:] The use of force, mental torture, threats, insults, or exposure to
unpleasant and inhumane treatment of any kind is prohibited by law and is
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Besides producing bad intelligence, torture produces more
terrorists.
Fawaz Gerges, in his authoritative study of how
doctrinaire jihadis turned their sights from local targets to the
West and its allies, notes that "Arab/Muslim prisons, particularly
their torture chambers, have served as incubators for generations
of jihadis."4 5 He links this "bloody history of official torture" with
a "culture of victimhood and desire for revenge [that] enables the
movement to mobilize young recruits and constantly renew
46
itself.,
Preemptive
war
has
also
proved
spectacularly
counterproductive for the goal of increased security.
Gerges
recounts study after study-including the findings of the director
of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Saudi Arabia's interior
minister, and virtually all American, European, and Arab analysts
to have considered the matter-that report an iron-clad
consensus: U.S. policy pursuant to the war on terrorism, including
the invasion and occupation of Iraq, "radicalizes Arab public
opinion," "fuel[s] Islamic resentment," provides recruiting tools
and a recruiting ground, and "play[s] directly into the hands of Al
Qaeda and other militants." 47 Admittedly, the security issue
would be a more complicated one had Saddam Hussein indeed
been tied to Al Qaeda or capable of threatening the United States,
which of course he was not. The many spurious rationales for
invading Iraq continue to produce distrust and sometimes
animosity in those who value truth.
neither authorized nor condoned by the US Government. Experience
indicates that the use of force is not necessary to gain the cooperation of
sources for interrogation. Therefore, the use of force is a poor technique, as it
yields unreliable results, may damage subsequent collection efforts, and can
induce the source to say whatever he thinks the interrogator wants to hear.")
45. GERGES, supranote 6, at 9.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 264-76. See also Peter Margulies, Making "Regime Change"
Multilateral: The War on Terror and Transitions to Democracy, 32 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 389, 396 (2004) ("Unfortunately, the preemptive style, rooted
in coercion and legal sanctions, does little to dislodge the processes of social
identity construction and social comparison that create a fertile ground for
asymmetric violence. Because of this negligible impact on underlying
processes, the Administration's approach to disrupting the social capital of
groups practicing asymmetric violence is ineffective. Indeed, the punitive
approach in some ways enhances the social capital available for asymmetric
violence, by sharpening the social comparisons that serve as the best
recruiting tools for those committed to extremism.")
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Beyond tilting public opinion in the Muslim world closer to Al
Qaeda, U.S. policy has caused sizable changes in global public
opinion. Respect for the United States has declined steeply since
the invasion of Iraq, and not just in Muslim countries. For
example, the number of people in Britain, France, and Germany
holding favorable views of the United States has decreased by 2030% between 2002 and 2007.48 Meanwhile, in Indonesia, the
world's largest Muslim country, the percentage of citizens holding
favorable views went from 61% in 2002 to 29% in the same time
span.

49

This does not surprise Joseph Nye. In his book, Soft Power:
The Means to Success in World Politics,50 Nye cites the
"plummeting" popularity of the United States and explains the
growing practical problem of securing help from Islamic countries
in locating and eliminating terrorists. 5 1 This is a two-sided
problem. As seen with Iraq, hard power policies increase the very
problem with which we need the help of foreign leaders. Nye
compares U.S. power to that of the Roman Empire and cautions
that "Rome did not succumb to the rise of another empire, but to
the onslaught of waves of barbarians. Modern high-tech terrorists
are the new barbarians."5 2 Relying on reports from American
intelligence and law enforcement officials, Nye confirms Gerges's
findings, locating in the Iraq War a source of Al Qaeda's growth:
"Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups intensified their recruitment
on three continents by 'tapping into rising anger about the
American campaign for war in Iraq."' 53 But, thanks to the second
part of the problem, declining U.S. popularity makes it politically
unpopular for foreign leaders to collaborate. Beyond aggravating
the problem of terrorism, the careless use of force and the
savagery of torture are quickly destroying our good name.
48. Meg Bortin, U.S. Faces More Distrust From World, Poll Shows, N.Y.
June 28, 2007, at A12.
49. Id.

TIMES,

50. NYE, supra note 11.
51. Id. at xi. See also id. at 129 ([T]he United States cannot meet the
new threat identified in the national security strategy without the
cooperation of other countries. They will cooperate up to a point out of mere
self-interest, but their degree of cooperation is also affected by the
attractiveness of the United States.").
52. NYE, supra note 11, at x.
53. Id. at 29.
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Nye writes that soft power is "the ability to get what you want
through attraction rather than coercion or payments." 54
He
specifies that this source of power emanates from "culture (in
places where it is attractive to others), [ ] political values (when [a
state] lives up to them at home and abroad), and [ ] foreign
policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral
authority). 5 5
Indefinite detention, torture, and preemptive
warfare have made short work of these last two sources of soft
power. Our political values do not merely include rights and the
rule of law; they reside in them. And yet, our extremists have
been quick to discard them both at home and abroad. A foreign
policy that includes aggressive warfare, extraordinary rendition,
and indefinite detention is per se illegitimate and strategically
disastrous.
It is to a nation's moral authority what the
molestation of children by priests is to a church's moral authority,
but perhaps worse since the imputed actions are for the most part
orders from high in the chain of command. Even those whose eyes
are fixed in precisely the right direction will have trouble seeing
that beacon of freedom said to originate in the United States; even
her greatest admirers now begin to doubt U.S. claims about
representing lauded values; even lovers of this country become
estranged.
War has this effect and an unlawful war of aggression doubles
it. Love is lost. Claims fail to touch upon truth. Freedom
becomes just an end, its extinction our daily bread. War, lawful or
not, falls on the extreme end of the hard power spectrumcoercion through violence, payments in blood. Understandably,
Nye counsels us to employ tools from the soft power spectrum
more frequently to achieve the balance between attraction and
coercion that he calls "smart power;" 56 however, we cannot even
begin to do this until we hold true to our political values at home
and abroad, and end our illegitimate and immoral foreign policies.

54. Id. at x.
55. Id. at 11.
56. See, e.g., the statement of the former Secretary General of NATO,
Jaap De Hoop Scheffer: "There is no final military answer for Afghanistan.
Afghanistan needs development, needs reconstruction, needs nationbuilding." Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General, Press Point at
Informal Meeting of NATO Defence Ministers
(Feb. 8, 2007),
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2007/s070208e.html.
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Perhaps then we can begin to think about eliminating the causes
of terrorism, instead of adding to them; perhaps then we can begin
to think about defeating our radical adversaries instead of
continuing to radicalize our moderate allies.
III. STAYING TRUE

Having examined the threat posed to the two ethics of our
civilizational project by our own extremists, let us consider how to
stay true to high-minded traditions in moments when we feel
threatened. Ronald Dworkin understands the tensions inherent
in upholding rights and political values in trying times. He
supplies guidance for avoiding derogations that, like those we
have seen, constitute a rescinding of the institution of rights itself.
Through a few of his quotations, I hope to illustrate a few
guideposts for how to re-adhere to our tradition-that is, to take

rights seriously again. "The concept of rights," says Dworkin, "has
its most natural use when a political society is divided, and
appeals to co-operation or a common goal are pointless."5 7 Rights
provide the ground rules for liberal democracy itself and for the
discourse, stability, and values of civility and restraint that

characterize it. Even if the political community driving U.S.
policy is divided on how to combat terrorism, we ought to be able
to find among the vast majority of the population common ground
where rights lie. Taking rights seriously means taking the rule of
law seriously and nobody, except extremists, believes this should
be easily discarded.
But how do we interpret rights? We may assume that, in a
democracy, a government's action and inaction alike flow from
popular opinion and the pursuit of general utility. Rights place
certain courses of action off the table and require others. Our
government may not, for example, inflict cruel and unusual
punishment, while it must provide certain procedural protections
at trial. In this way, rights circumscribe a government's realms of
action and passivity, and, thus, constitute a restraint on politically
57.

RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 184 (1978).

Although

this book addresses the rights of citizens against their government, we have
It must as an
seen that this institution transcends U.S. borders.
instrumental matter, Nye would tell us, in order for our values and foreign
policy to generate soft power, but we know that it does as a formalistic
matter, given the international revolution.

20081

CORRUPTION OF CIVILIZATIONS

dominant preferences. Again, moderates in the United States,
which is to say the great majority of the population, ought to be
able to find common ground in twin convictions implied above and
embraced by Dworkin: rights that can be overruled in light of
shifting opinion are not rights at all; and rights that the majority
can revoke at will in the interest of its general utility are similarly
vacuous. Each situation, if taken as justifying the58revocation of
rights, reveals the institution of rights to be a sham.
But what if the political community is threatened? Surely
this is the reason we have given for discarding rights during our
war on terrorism. There is a chance that someone released from
Guantanamo was wrongly deemed innocent. This person will then
rejoin the enemy and perhaps perpetrate a great attack against
us. Even with Jose Padilla and Hamdi, the two American citizens
famously denied for years any semblance of due process rights, the
government's claims boiled down to these two individuals being
tied to terrorists and that no chances should be taken in dealing
with them. Dworkin is cautious. He writes that "There would be
no point in the boast that we respect individual rights unless that
involved some sacrifice, and the sacrifice in question must be that
we give up whatever marginal benefits our country would receive
59
from overriding these rights when they prove inconvenient.
This is to say that general utility justifications for rights
violations fall short. "Yes," we might respond, "but what if we are
speaking not of marginal benefits but avoiding catastrophic
harm?"
Dworkin concedes that a genuine emergency, one of "clear and
present danger . . . of magnitude," may justify a curtailment of

58. Id. at 191 ("normally it is a sufficient justification ... that the act [of
the Government] is calculated to increase . . . general utility [but] [w]hen
individual citizens are said to have rights against the Government . . . that
must mean that this sort of justification is not enough.") See also id. at 193
("There would be no point in the boast that we respect individual rights
unless that involved some sacrifice, and the sacrifice in question must be that
we give up whatever marginal benefits our country would receive from
overriding these rights when they prove inconvenient") and 194 ("A right
against the Government must be a right to do something even when the
majority thinks it would be wrong to do it, and even when the majority would
be worse off for having it done.").
59. DWORKIN, supra note 57, at 193.
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rights. 6 ° International law also conditions derogation on an
emergency of certain magnitude. Consider the ICCPR derogation
clause: "In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the
nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the
States Parties . . . may take measures derogating from their
obligations ... to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of

the situation."6 1 But this clause is subject to a sizable limitation:
The ICCPR prohibits derogation from, inter alia, those articles
concerning torture and cruel treatment, the right to life, and
personhood. 6 2 This may be the first difference between Dworkin
and the international standard: the latter places some derogations
off of the table, irregardless of magnitude. The second difference
concerns magnitude itself. The ICCPR would seem to require the
highest possible level of danger, perhaps beyond the reach of
many 9/11s and in the realm of war against an enemy that could
actually defeat the state. Let us be realistic, however, and
concede that most states will not risk such outcomes.
So let us focus on the criteria most attune to the dilemmas of
a permanent war on terrorism: clear and present danger as
supplied by Dworkin-i.e., the certainty of the threat-and the
notion of all derogations being permissible only to the extent
strictly required by the situation.
The latter requires that
infringements on rights be narrowly tailored to accomplish a
necessary objective. It immediately invalidates torture and the
War in Iraq, since these derogations only aggravate terrorism.
Rather than strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,
such unreliable, costly, and counterproductive policies ought to be
strictly prohibited by the exigencies of the situation.
But this logic would also eliminate the criterion of certainty,
because it would view even an impending terrorist attack as
irrelevant to a government interest in employing torture. Some in
the administration, on the other hand, must be convinced that
waterboarding and extraordinary rendition do provide some

60. Id. at 195. Dworkin also recognizes that preserving the rights of
some may also justify the violation of the rights of others. See id. at 194 ("In
order to save [rights], we must recognize as competing rights only the rights
of other members of the society as individuals.").
61. Int'l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. art. 4, 1966, 14668
U.N.T.S. 174, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/accpr.htm.
62. See id. at arts. 6-8, 11, 15, 16, and 18.
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benefit; otherwise they would not permit these practices. For
example, President Bush recently vetoed a bill that would have
required the CIA to limit its interrogation tactics to those
authorized by the Army Field Manual. 63 "Because the danger
remains, we need to ensure our intelligence officials have all the
64
tools they need to stop the terrorists," the President remarked.
And to credit this foolishness further, surely a policy of indefinite
detention would, assuming even a 1:1,000,000 ratio of terrorists to
innocent bystanders in detention, provide some marginal benefit
to immediate security interests. Support for torture is indeed an
extreme view, even descriptively speaking, as seen in a recent
BBC study. When asked whether they would support torture if it
could provide information that would save innocent lives, only 36%
65
of Americans said "yes."
Because there is some chance that indefinite detention would
prevent a loss or that torture would perhaps occasionally yield
useful information, should we not therefore rescind the prohibition
on torture and the right to due process?
Dworkin grows
impatient:
[T]his argument ignores the primitive distinction between
what may happen and what will happen. If we allow
speculation to support the justification of emergency or
decisive benefit, then, again, we have annihilated rights.
We must, as Learned Hand said, discount the gravity of
the evil threatened by the likelihood of reaching that
66
evil.
For Bush, it is not just about clinging to torture; it is also
about clinging to unfettered executive power to judge what is
necessary in any given situation.
The power to define the
situation itself, though, must not be ceded. This is the power to
define a state of constant emergency through speculation. If we
are truly under grave and imminent threat, then a strong
executive must do what he deems necessary to protect us. So let

63.

Steven Lee Myers, Bush Vetoes Bill on C.I.A. Tactics, Affirming

Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2008, at Al.
64. See id. at 1.
65. One-Third Support 'Some Torture,' B.B.C. News, Oct. 19, 2006,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in depth/6063386.stm#table.
66. DWORKIN, supra note 57, at 195.
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us turn to the criterion of certainty, clear and present danger.
This is the guidepost to hold dear. Because this war on terrorism
has no known endpoint, the constant threat of terrorism must not
be taken as sufficient justification for overriding rights. Consider
President Bush's introduction of the war on terror to a joint
session of Congress:

Our war on terror begins with al-Qaida, but it does not
end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of
global reach has been found, stopped and defeated . . .

Our response involves far more than instant retaliation
and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one
battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have
ever seen.

67

If we are not to be in a permanent era of torture, indefinite
detention, and revocation of the rule against aggressive warfare,
then we must insist on a higher degree of certainty of harm before
bowing to bald assertions of constant threat.
And, given the depth of our tradition of rights and its value to
us and the world, something must be said about the type of harm
grave enough to warrant casting aside our identity and
civilizational membership. Dworkin provides a test for
determining whether a right can be defined narrowly in a
particular case, to avoid its application in that case, without
revealing as a sham the initial recognition of the right. First is
the marginal situation where the values protected by the original
right are not at stake or only partly at stake. 68 Surely our
extremists have argued along these lines in maintaining
Guantanamo Bay to be a legal blackhole where no law applies,
and in insisting that the Geneva Conventions do not apply to
unlawful combatants. Second is a situation where extension of
This is
the right would abridge some competing right.69
important for the right to life of U.S. citizens, for all manner of
rights really, that would be extinguished by a direct terrorist
attack. But this returns us to the problem of certainty and
exigency already discussed-can we be so sure that an attack is
67. 147 CONG. REC. 107, 123 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 2001) (statement of
President George W. Bush).
68. DWORKIN, supra note 57, at 200.
69. Id.
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forthcoming and that torture and indefinite detention would do
anything to prevent it? Third is a situation in which extending
the right would occasion a cost to society "of a degree far beyond
the cost paid to grant the original right. 70 I read this to require a
weighing of the historical struggles that culminated in our
tradition of fundamental rights. Depending on the right in
question, these might include the Revolutionary War, the
movement to abolish slavery, the civil rights movement, the cost of
World War II and the human rights movement, and all manner of
wars over centuries that led to the jus in bello legal framework.
These costs should give us pause, a reason to reflect on just
how precious the institution of rights is and how only the gravest
of costs could justify derogation. Literally, only a traitor would
hold that a marginal increase in the possibility of a terrorist
attack justifies rescinding our tradition of rights. If clear and
present danger of the first magnitude, coupled with a reasonable
expectation of avoidance through derogation, then perhaps. But
only then, lest we reveal ourselves to be imposters holding out a
venerable tradition as our own.
Still one matter attends us, yet it is beset by nationalism and
provincialism. Dworkin's guidance was given with regard to the
rights of citizens. I took it broadly and applied it to citizens
(Padilla, et. al) and non-citizens (Guantanamo, Abu Graib,
extraordinary rendition, and etc.) alike. In the late 1940s, our
tradition began to embrace human rights, not just U.S.
constitutional rights. This much is formalistically clear from our
membership in various treaties and the world community more
generally, pursuant to which we have accepted the premise that
human dignity matters, not just the dignity of Americans. But we
must also recognize it to be pragmatically important, given that
terrorist recruitment thrives on our abandonment of our own
values and on the reasonable perceptions of U.S. foreign relations
impropriety that follow. As we have seen, rights are part of the
currency of soft power, a badge of belonging in the community of
civilized nations, and a requirement for securing international
collaboration to combat terrorism. Dworkin reminds us that:
[I}f rights make sense at all, then the invasion of a

70. Id.
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relatively important right [such as due process or freedom
from cruel treatment) must be a very serious matter. It
means treating a man as less than a man, or as less
worthy of concern than other men. The institution of
rights rests on the conviction that this is a grave injustice
",71

We must take this to heart with regard to all human beings if we
wish to address terrorism and if, in the process, we wish to retain
what is good in our identities and heritage, and what is
indispensable for a desirable future.
In the end, we must consider whether the juxtaposition
between human rights and national security is false. Perhaps the
way to achieve freedom and security is via human rights. Perhaps
the deontological and consequentialist ethics of our tradition have
been improperly separated. Perhaps rights, rightly understood,
are the foundation of both human dignity and peace. But for those
who do not accept such a premise, which is implied in Jefferson's
hope for our shining city on the hill and specified outright by
Wilsonian idealists, my hope is that they will at least value their
tradition enough to not trade it in for scrap.
Though inconvenient at times, rights are part of who we are
and our adherence to them gives us pride about who we are
becoming. It is, after all, in each of our actions that civilization
lives or dies. Some would say that we know this by virtue of
universal moral traits: "in the soul of man," said Emerson, "there
is a justice whose retributions are instant and entire. He who
does a good deed, is instantly ennobled himself. He who does a
mean deed, is by the action itself contracted., 72 Others would add
that we know this by virtue of the consequences of our actions.
The Arab poet Adonis sums these up when, referring to our
infamous foreign policy actions, he cites an "anguish which
transcends private passion and pain."7 3 This, he says, "creates

civilizational agony for man and humanity." 74 I would say that we
know it through both means-deontology and pragmatism-and,
71. Id. at 199.
72. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Divinity School Address (1838) in LAWRENCE
BUELL, THE AMERICAN TRANSCENDENTALISTS 131 (2006).
73. GERGES, supra note 6, at 271 (quoting Adonis, Beyond History,
Without Future,AL HAYAT, Dec. 4, 2003).
74.

Id.
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thus confirmed twice over, it becomes our task as citizens in a
democracy to produce something better than a war on terrorism.
In the beginning of this essay, I conceded that the prospect of
our tradition's demise at our own hands was a conceit. This is
important to admit, because our piecemeal abandonment of a
tradition should not be confused with that tradition's demise, and
much less with the demise of the principles on which that
tradition was based. Walt Whitman said this about liberty, the
organizing principle of our tradition:
Nothing has precedence of it and nothing can warp or
degrade it. Liberty relies upon itself, invites no one,
promises nothing, sits in calmness and light, is positive
and composed, and knows no discouragement. The battle
rages with many a loud alarm and frequent advance and
retreat . . . the enemy triumphs . . . the prison, the
handcuffs, the iron necklace and anklet, the scaffold,
garrote and leadballs do their work ... the cause is asleep
... the strong throats are choked with their own blood...
the young men drop their eyelashes toward the ground
when they pass each other . . . and is liberty gone out of
that place? No never. When liberty goes it is not the first
to go nor the second or third to go ... it waits for all the
rest to go . . . it is the last ... When ... the laws of the
free are grudgingly permitted and laws for informers and
blood-money are sweet to the taste of the people... when
the soul retires in the cool communion of the night and
surveys its experience and has much extasy over the word
and deed that put back a helpless innocent person into
the gripe of the gripers . . . when the swarms of cringers,
suckers, doughfaces, lice of politics, planners of sly
involutions for their own preferment . . . obtain a
response of love and natural deference from the people..
• or rather when all life and all the souls of men and
women are discharged from any part of the earth-then
only shall the instinct of liberty be discharged from that
part of the earth.7 5

75. WALT WHITMAN, LEAVES OF GRASS (1855) in WALT WHITMAN:
COMPLETE POETRY AND COLLECTED PROSE 17-18 (Library of America, 1982).
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It is with Whitman's words that I close, because he is
remarkably clear on a point that we, apparently, are not. Our
sacred principles are above and beyond us, and yet by doing what
we know to be right we connect with them, becoming of them and
them of us, and it is in this connection that we and our country
have shown notable, if yet inconstant, greatness. Greatness arises
from challenges being met, especially that constant challenge of
living up to one's principles. Slavery presented such a challenge,
as did the subjugation of women and most recently homosexuals,
and continued attention remains necessary on these fronts. The
War on Terrorism presents a new front on which we are called to
live up to our principles, and if we look carefully we see
intertwined with these principles our own identities, fates, and
legacies. And so it may be true that liberty, dignity, equality, and
peace are beyond us, but we should not assume that we-in any
form cognizable to us-are beyond them.

